In a broadcast talk delivered in 1956, the late J. L. Austin began by outlining to his listeners his now well-known concept of ‘the performative utterance and its infelicities’; and at the end of that first section of his talk he made this comment: ‘That equips us, we may suppose, with two shining new tools to crack the crib of reality maybe. It also equips us – it always does – with two shining new skids under our metaphysical feet’. In (...) this talk I intend to illustrate a particular respect in which, in moral philosophy, the partial pessimism of Austin's comment has proved abundantly justified. I shall try to show how in this field one shining new tool has led in fact to the skidding of moral philosophers' feet – how one bright idea has led some influential theorists off in the wrong direction, and the rest of us back in the end, with rather little gained, to a position not far from that of our predecessors of about a hundred years ago. This dismal story, I should in justice make clear at the outset, is not that of the whole of moral philosophy, not even of moral philosophy in English; I shall be tracing only one out of several concurrent lines of thought, but the line which I shall trace will be, I think, readily recognised as having been, and perhaps as still being, more conspicuous than most. (shrink)

The question that I want to debate a little in this paper could be put in this way: what, and how much, empirical information is required for, or relevant to, moral philosophy? That question may well strike one as somewhat vague and woolly. Rightly so. What is needed to get rather clearer about its answer or possible answers is chiefly, I believe, to get clearer about its sense.

Professor Frankena mentions me as one of the participants in what he calls the Movement in moral philosophy, and I think he is right; I was so moving, or being moved along among others, ten years or so ago, and I think I find myself still inclined to so move, while recognising with regret, when I come to look back at it, that, as he courteously observes, “what such writers say is not as clear as one would like.” I embark (...) on commenting upon his lectures with considerable trepidation, however, for the reason that, while his own writing surely is as clear as one could reasonably hope for, I have had great difficulty in figuring out what exactly it is in the Movement that he substantially dissents from, and have the lurking suspicion that there may be something that I have just failed to see. Tentatively, though, I tend to think that the root of my difficulty has been that he offers, in opposition to the Movement, an account of these matters that is really, in the end, not intelligible; and my main task in this commentative piece will be to try to explain why I think that. (shrink)

Existentialism, by A. Macintyre.--Sartre the philosopher, by S. Hampshire.--The phenomenological philosophy in France, by I.W. Alexander.--Imagination, by H. Ishiguro.--Authenticity and obligation, by F.A. Olafson.--Pessimism and optimism in Sartre's thought, by F. Jeanson.--Sartre as critic, by H. Wardman.--Sartre's literary criticism, by O. Hahn.--Sartre as a playwright: The flies and Dirty hands, by W. Kaufmann.--Sartre as dramatist, by D. Bradby.--The existentialist rediscovery of Hegel and Marx, by G.L. Kline.--Sartre's ideal of social unity, by H.R. Burkel.--Praxis and dialectic in Sartre's critique, by A. (...) Manser.--Sartre and the humanist tradition in sociology, by M.A. and D. Weinstein.--Bibliography (p. [387]-390). (shrink)

I argue that the current view (as held by, eg., Warnock, Anscombe and Stenius) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractates is mistaken. This view maintains that Wittgenstein's theory is one of 'isomorphism'; that, roughly, a sentence has meaning in virtue of its being a facsimile of a fact or possible fact. But a detailed study of significant passages in the Tractattis shows that Wittgenstein held no such view. His use of important terms, such as Salz, Bild, Sachverhalt, (...) Tatsache , etc., has been crucially misunderstood. There is no isomorphism. The theory is not about sentences at all, but about talking sense. (shrink)

The problem of self-knowledge, originally ethnic, and then national, always excited and continues to worry humanity. At different times, she was sharper, then she calmed down, then stepped forward, then she became one in line with other issues of political, economic and social life. But this problem was inevitable. It was one of the sources of the spirit and activities of the people.

G I Wall; The Concept of Vocational Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 51–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

The study of professional ethics has a long tradition in the Soviet Union; medical ethics is a code of conduct as well as an academic discipline. The paper discusses the ethical issues in intensive care, the definition of death, abortion, euthanasia, and the moral aspects of medical mistakes.

In the system of the philosophical and sociological ideas of the Frankfurt School the "critical theory" of society occupies the central place. In the "critical theory" are interwoven all the most significant aspects of the philosophical, economic, political, sociological, psychological, aesthetic, and ethical ideas dealt with by the representatives of this school. And therefore it is not accidental that the concept of the "critical theory" of society is employed frequently as a synonym of the social philosophy of the Frankfurt School. (...) The multi-leveled problematique of the "critical theory" of society, and the contradictoriness of the theoretical positions of its adherents, complicate critical analysis. Therefore, the explanation of its methodological orientation, which can help us to understand better the existence and actual philosophical nature of this theory, has important significance for our discussion. (shrink)